ImageRunner: Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in GCP Cloud Run

An attacker with `run.services.update` and `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permissions but without explicit registry access could deploy new revisions of Cloud Run services that pulled private container images stored in the same GCP project. This was possible because Cloud Run uses a service agent with the necessary registry read permissions to retrieve these images, regardless of the caller’s access level. By updating a service revision and injecting malicious commands into the container's arguments (e.g., using Netcat for reverse shell access), attackers could extract secrets or run unauthorized code. The flaw stemmed from the Cloud Run service agent’s trust model, which did not enforce a separate registry permission check on the deploying identity. Google has since modified this behavior to require that the identity updating the Cloud Run resource also has explicit Artifact Registry Reader or Storage Object Viewer roles.

Cloud Run

No tracked CVEs